The Awful Statute Book of Great Britain by Hutton, Noel
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Addison Harris Lecture Lectures
1975
The Awful Statute Book of Great Britain
Noel Hutton
First Parliamentary Counsel
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/harris
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lectures at
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Addison Harris Lecture by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hutton, Noel, "The Awful Statute Book of Great Britain" (1975). Addison Harris Lecture. Paper 6.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/harris/6
THE AWFUL STATUTE BOOK OF GREAT BRITAIN*
Sir Noel Hutton**
The Statutes of the United Kingdom have never been the object
of much admiration, at all events in the United Kingdom it-
self. One of my predecessors, as First Parliamentary Counsel,
Sir William Graham Harrison, writing in 19351 said that they
resembled the early Christians in Rome: "As for this sect,
we know that everywhere it is spoken against." More recent-
ly Lord Gardiner, who was Lord Chancellor in the Labour
Administration of 1964-70 and in that capacity initiated or
participated in a number of changes (always referred to
honoris causa as "reforms"), addressed the University of
Durham on the subject of the Role of the Lord Chancellor in
the field of Law Reform.2 His address listed the things
which the new Law Commission, set up by Act of Parliament
in 1965, had done, were doing and had yet to do. It con-
tained the following passage relating to the Statute law:
"Sixthly, the reform of our awful Statute Book, which, when
I took office, contained over 3,000 Public Acts of Parlia-
ment dating back to 1225, is at last really under way."
So we have the highest judicial authority (our Lord Chan-
cellor combines the position of Chief Minister responsible
for the administration of the law with that of head of the
Judiciary) for the proposition that our Statute Book is
awful. Lord Gardiner made no secret of his views while in
office, and it is fair to say that he had as little admi-
ration for the language and structure of contemporary
legislation as for the way in which the whole Statute Law
as in force is arranged and published. In what follows I
shall say something first about the methods by which we
produce the legislation comprised in this awful Statute
Book, and secondly about the detailed criticisms which it
provokes and the remedies adopted to meet those criticisms.
In doing so I shall take leave to embark on one or two
digressions culled from a lifetime in the centre of the
legislative machine.
*This article is a revised and abbreviated version of
two lectures delivered at Bloomington, Indiana, in October,
1971, under the terms of the Addison Harris Bequest. The
editors are grateful to Professor F. Reed Dickerson for
aiding us in obtaining it for publication and in commenting
on it in the footnotes.
**A.B., University of Oxford; Parliamentary Counsel's
Office, 1938-1968, The First Parliamentary Counsel,
1956-1968; Queen's Counsel since 1962, Bencher of
Lincoln's Inn since 1967.
How Legislation is Developed in England
There are two material distinctions between the legislative
processes in the United States and the United Kingdom of
which one is elementary and the other less well-known.
The first is that in the United Kingdom the members of the
Government are not excluded from the legislature. The
political executive is drawn almost exclusively from
members of one or other House of Parliament, and mainly
of course from the Commons. There was indeed a brief
period at the outset of the 18th Century when an Act was
in prospective operation which would have excluded from the
Commons all holders of office of profit under the Crown
3;
but this was superseded in 1705 by the Succession to the
Crown Act,4 which, after a long battle between the two
Houses, produced a modified rule embodied in two of the
worst-drafted sections I ever had to deal with in the
course of 33 years on the job. The combined effect of
these was understood to be that the holders of new offices
of profit under the Crown (i.e., those created after 1705)
were absolutely disqualified for the Commons. This was of
course designed to prevent the Sovereign packing the
Commons with "place-men." On the other hand the holders
of old offices (Secretary of State and so forth) could sit
in the Commons, provided they were elected or re-elected
after appointment. This system, heavily patched and
shored up by some 80 subsequent Acts dealing with particular
offices, survived for 250 years. One result was that
when a new Government was formed and a member of the
Commons appointed to an "old" office, he had to resign
his seat and contest a bye-election in the course of
which, occasionally, he failed to secure re-election;
and the Government then had to find him another seat,
which might be done by getting hold of another supporter
with a really safe majority and tempting him with a
peerage--an article then more highly prized than it is
today. 5 That particular element of comedy was eliminated
in 1919;6 further simplifications were made in 1937; 7
and finally in 1957 the whole tangle was swept away by
they House of Commons Disqualification Act of that
year,8 which repealed sections 24 and 25 of the
Succession to the Crown Act 1707 and about 120 other
enactments, and as regards the political offices imposed
a mere limitation on the number of Ministers who could
sit simultaneously in the House of Commons. The whole
list runs to about 100 offices, and the effect of the
limit is that a small number of Ministers of each class
(the absolute minimum in the case of a Labour Adminis-
tration) are drawn from the House of Lords.
The Bill for the Act of 1957 was unusual in many ways,
including the time from the drawing board to final enact-
ment (14 years) and the procedure in Parliament, where
the Bill was referred to a Select Committee (much more
similar to American legislative Committees than the
normal Standing Committee which considers our legislation).
At almost the last moment I was asked by the Committee
to turn the Bill completely inside out and convert what
had been a scheme disqualifying for membership of the
Commons the holders of a large range of Government and
other specified posts, with all the trimmings necessary
to deal with the consequences of a breach, into a scheme
disqualifying members of the Commons from holding those posts
with an entirely different set of trimmings. This was done
in quick time, but in the long run the alternative was not
adopted, which was perhaps as well because, although it
had certain virtues, the chances of getting everything
right with a volteface of those dimensions at that stage
were not high. There is a moral here for students of
legislative drafting. You can compress the drafting time
just so far (and your clients will usually expect maximum
compression as a matter of course); but if you try to go
even faster, you will probably fall flat on yourface.
Another moral for such students, this time in the Act of
1705, is that compromise usually breeds ambiguity. But
the main point that emerges from the contemplation of this
legislation is the extraordinary adaptability of legal
concepts, whether statutory or not. In this case, the
original distinction between Crown Offices of profit old
and new in 1705 gradually transformed into an entirely
different distinction between political offices which could
Cand in some cases must) be filled by members of the
Commons, and other offices, whether in the Crown service or
not, from which members of the Commons were totally excluded;
but right down to 1957 the new distinction remained
balanced on the original enactment.
The presence in the House of Commons of most of the govern-
ment, drawn from and supported by a reliable majority
in that House, means that with rare exceptions, Government
legislation is always passed and no other legislation is
passed unless agreed to by the Government. The official
opposition do not now introduce Bills. There are limited
facilities for what are known as Private Members' Bills,
but these are either uncontroversial or, occasionally, so
controversial that no government would wish to be involved
either way. The Abortion Act of 19679 was an instance
of the latter kind. When such a Bill shows signs of passing,
the government endeavours to remain neutral, but tries to
get the drafting as right as possible and for that
purpose authorises its own draftsmen to prepare any
necessary amendments. Having handled that particular
job, I am not proud of the result. This was however
another case of a Bill founded on a compromise, in which
precision was hardly attainable. It appears that the
Act works in practice and produces the results intended
by at least some of the legislators who passed it; and in
point of precision it is perhaps a little worse than
the previous law.1 0
The second main distinction between our legislative
process and yours has been examined elsewhere by
Professor Dickerson.1 1  In the United States there may
be many bodies of legislative draftsmen providing the
input to any particular legislature; and that legis-
lature itself usually has its own corps of draftsmen
as well. In Great Britain, on the other hand, almost
all government Bills (and this, as explained above, means
almost all Bills that are in fact enacted) are drafted
by one small self-contained body of government lawyers
known as the Parliamentary Counsel. I say "almost"
only because we have two systems of law, English and Scots,
and Bills which relate exclusively to Scotland are handled
by the Lord Advocate's Department. This system dates from
1869, before which I believe our system (so far as we had
one) approximated more closely to that which prevails in
the States today. The position of the Parliamentary
Counsel in the British Civil Service is unusual. They are
not responsible to any particular Minister for the way
they conduct their drafting business. For pay and rations
they belong to the Prime Minister's Civil Service Depart-
ment; in the preparation of each Bill they act for the
particular Minister who is responsible or primarily re-
sponsible for that Bill. They are in effect on the cab
rank. Before a particular Minister can hail the cab he
has to obtain Cabinet approval both for his journey,
and for the Session in which he is to take it. Our
Parliament normally turns out 70 or 80 Acts per Session,
so it would not only break the system but would serve no
useful purpose if 200 Bills were being prepared simul-
taneously. Accordingly we have an elaborate and
efficient Cabinet drill by which the competing bids for
Government legislation are collated and reduced (by a
combination of horse-trading and sheer brutality) to a
manageable ration for the ensuing Session.
Once instructions for a Bill are given and received,
the analogy of the cab driver continues. The Minister
can't select a particular cab off the rank. That is done
by the First Parliamentary Counsel. Nor does the
selected draftsman just drive the customer straight
towards his destination regardless of the rules and cour-
tesies of the road. He has to ensure that the department's
legislative scheme is internally coherent and effective
and that the substance and language of the Bill are con-
sistent with the pattern of the general law. On legal
matters he is not a mere temporary employee of the
Minister. In practice he exercises his own judgment
but can if necessary refer any question of doubt to the
Attorney General, as the Minister primarily concerned with
the legal aspects of current legislation. Again, the
draftsmen stand in a position of trust towards Parliament
and the officers of both Houses, who have no corps of
draftsmen of their own. There is room here for friction
between Ministers and the draftsmen; but, as Sir Alan
Ellis (another predecessor of mine) wrote in 1949, "It
is to the credit of the British genius for adjustments
that there is in fact no case on record of a difference
between a Minister and the temporary pilot of his ship
with whom the Office supplies him which has called for
a decision on how such a difference should be re-
solved.
,,1 2
When a draft Bill is ready to be introduced it is circu-
lated to all Government departments and examined by a
small committee of Ministers, sometimes known as the
"Legislation Committee." This is not a "policy"
committee--the general policy has been decided else-
where before drafting began--and it is not a drafting
committee in the sense of going through the Bill line
by line and making amendments. But it does consider
both peripheral questions of policy, including legal
policy, and points of drafting which are thrown up by the
Minister in charge of the Bill or by other members of the
Committee. This is essentially the forum in which general
decisions can be arrived at (and subsequently enforced
if necessary) upon typical recurrent questions such as
the scale of penalties for offences: whether, and if so
how, a continuing penalty should be imposed for a con-
tinuing offence; whether it is permissible (in view of
the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility) to
enact that one Minister must consult another in carrying
out a particular function;1 3 or whether any and what ex-
press provision should be made for securing (or ex-
cluding) a civil remedy in damages at the suit of a
person injured by the breach of a new statutory duty im-
posed by the legislation and enforceable by criminal pro-
ceedings. 1 4 To those familiar with the working of com-
mittees in general it will come as no surprise if I add
that such decisions, once arrived at, are often overthrown
in relation to the next Bill that comes along, and the
draftsmen of subsequent Bills are left wondering which
decision to follow. The Attorney General or the
Solicitor General takes an active part in these meetings,
and one of the duties of the draftsman is to brief them
in writing on points of legal policy and on any matters
which have given rise to special difficulty in the course
of the drafting. This is a laborious business when
properly done, and it has to be done when the pressure
of time is at the maximum. But it is a salutory
exercise for the draftsman. -The need to explain what
has been written often exposes the possibility of im-
proving it.
After the Bill is introduced into Parliament, the Minister
still retains effective control over the language and struc-
ture. In the House of Commons, where most Government
Bills and almost all important ones are introduced, the
Bill can be amended at two stages, committee and report.
The committee may be a committee of the whole House
(comprising over 600 members) but more usually it is one
of the Standing Committees. There are usually five or
six of these Committees comprising between 20 and 30
members. They are not specialists in the sense of dealing
with particular subjects such as Law and Order, or Trade.
Two of them are composed of all the members who sit for
constituencies in Scotland and Wales respectively, and
deal with Bills relating exclusively to those parts of
the country (the latter are rare). But apart from
those, the business taken in any particular Standing
Committee depends simply on which of them is available
to handle it, and the actual allocation of Bills is
settled by the Government Whips acting in consultation
with the Opposition Whips. Each of these Committees has
a chairman (drawn from a panel which includes both
Government and Opposition members) and a permanent
nucleus of members. Additional members are nominated
for each particular Bill by their own party Whips. Care
is always taken to ensure that the voting strength on the
Committee reflects the voting strength in the whole
House--in other words the Government always has a
majority of at least one. The chairman of the Committee
is essentially neutral (like the Speaker in the House).
He is there to enforce compliance with -the rules of order
and to ensure that minority views get a fair crack of the
whip. Although amendments to the Bill can in theory be
moved without notice, in practice written notice is given
of all proposed amendments, and these are printed and cir-
culated before the meetings of the Committee. There are
often very large numbers of notices of amendments. On my
own last Bill, the Parliament (No.2) Bill of 196915 we had
notice of 280 separate amendments at the Committee Stage.
In the case of the Industrial Relations Bill of 1971, I
believe the number was 950. The Chairman of the Committee
goes through all the proposed amendments with the advice
of (a) the Committee Clerk, an officer on the staff of the
House of Commons who is neither a draftsman nor a lawyer,
but probably well experienced in the legislative process,
and (b) the draftsman of the Bill. Some are rejected as
"out of order" for one reason or another. From the remainder
a selection is made with a view to securing an orderly de-
bate in which most or all of the points of substance on
each clause are discussed. At this point, as already
mentioned, the draftsman is no longer acting as the Minis-
ter's servant or agent--he gives the best information and
advice he can with complete impartiality. The one privilege
the Government has here (and it has it not because it is
the Government but because the Minister is "the Member in
charge of the Bill") is that all Government amendments
are selected for debate, unless, improbably, they are found
to be out of order. I was once "no-balled" on a Government
amendment, but this doesn't often happen.
To sum up, the Standing Committee is not an autonomous body
with a particular sphere of expertise, armed with its own
legal and drafting services and equipped to negotiate
with the Administration on the substance and detail of
the Bill before it. It has no power to call for or re-
ceive evidence from the Government or elsewhere. It is
just a stage in the Parliamentary process, subsequent
to the decision of the Whole House on Second Reading
approving the principles of the Bill. Amendments contrary
to the principles of the Bill (known as "wrecking amend-
ments") are out of order. The Minister, so long as he can
command the support of his own party in the Committee,
can more or less count on the vote if it comes to a
division. The proceedings are almost adversary in
character. 1 6 If, as sometimes happens by inadvertence or
otherwise, an adverse vote is carried in Committee, the
Government can, if necessary, get it reversed at the
Report Stage, where their majority is more reliable.
The mechanics are different in the House of Lords, but
the results are very much the same. The Government of the
day is more or less well represented in this House as
well as the Commons, but a Labour administration can't
rely on a majority there. The House of Lords is still
basically a hereditary body comprising the holders for the
time being of titles which have been conferred over the
years by the Sovereign in the exercise of the Royal
prerogative, and these are still mostly Conservatives.
It is difficult to believe--indeed we can hardly believe it
ourselves--that in this day and age the legislature of
a highly developed democracy can include a body of this
nature: but this is another of our antique institutions,
of which the basic structure has been patched and altered
to the point where it bears little resemblance to the
original. As matters stand, the legislative powers of the
Lords are restricted both by Parliamentary usage and by
the Parliamentary Act 1911.T7 They don't initiate or amend
financial Bills; and as regards other Bills which are sent
up from the Commons any head-on clash between the two Houses
can be resolved, in the long run, in favour of the Commons.
Originally the procedure for that purpose involved a delay
of three Sessions of Parliament, but this was cut to two
in 1949 during the first post-war Labour Administration. 1 8
In my time as First Parliamentary Counsel I was engaged
on three successive operations on this venerable patient,
the first two successful and the third not. By 1957 the
representation of the Labour Party in the Lords had be-
come quite inadequate. Conservative Prime Ministers were
ready and willing to recommend senior Labour politicians
for elevation to the peerage to supply the deficiency; but
the party was opposed in principle to the hereditary system
and it had become increasingly difficult to find suitable
men who would devote not only themselves but their eldest
sons and their remoter issue to maintaining the system.
Some of the old war-horses who had accepted the transition
when no alternative was available were already regretting
the effects on their families, and in particular Lord
Stansgate, formerly Mr. Wedgwood Benn, whose active son
was doing very well in the Labour Party in the Commons
and wanted to stay there when his father died. That
particular saga could easily fill two or three articles
but must be taken very shortly here. Meanwhile the
immediate remedy was to provide for the creation of peerages
for life, which would entitle the holders to a seat in
the Lords but would not descend to their heirs. This was
done by the Life Peerages Act 1958, a very short and
simple Act.1 9 Supporters of Women's Lib will note with
approval subsection (3) of section 1: "A life peerage
may be conferred under this section on a woman," which
was not quite as easy to draft as it looks. (That sub-
section has been liberally used, and generally speaking we
find that Life Ladies, like other ladies, are generally
speaking.) The Bill for this Act was treated by the
Labcur opposition under Sir Hugh Gaitskill with a reserve
amounting almost to contempt, but in practice it has
been operated by both parties and the House is now well
stocked with experienced politicians holding life
peerages. Only a handful of the hereditary peers who
have acquired their titles by succession take any
regular part in the legislative process and those who
do are well qualified for the purpose. Both major parties
and also the Liberal Party are well represented, and there
are many active peers who are committed to no party. In
practice it is now a compact and efficient component of
the legislative machine.
The next step was taken in 1963 as the result of the
gallant battle sustained by the Wedgwood Benns. It was
now generally accepted that the hereditary system could
operate to the disadvantage of the successor. If he was
in the House of Commons (or wanted to get there) he would
be automatically disqualified whether or not he took up
his seat in the Lords Even in other fields the possession
of a title could be an embarrassment. To deal with this,
the Peerage Act of 196320 enabled any person who succeeded
to a hereditary peerage to disclaim it within a year
after succeeding or after attaining his majority, which
ever was the later. According to my recollection it
was originally intended not to make this provision retro-
active; but in the long run those peers who had already
succeeded were given 12 months from the end of July 1963
in which they too could disclaim the title. This was
primarily of interest to Mr. Wedgwood Benn, who duly dis-
claimed and subsequently held office as a Cabinet Minister
in the Commons throughout the Labour Administration of
1964 to 1970. It also produced spectacular effects on
the leadership of the Conservative Party. Lord Hailsham
reisgned his hereditary peerage in order to make himself
available for selection as Mr. Quintin Hogg. In Practice
Lord Home was selected instead, and he was still in time
to disclaim his peerage, take over the Premiership, and
fight in the next election as Sir Alec Douglas Home.
In fact the Conservatives lost that election and the next.
By the time they got back in 1970, Sir Alec had been re-
placed by Mr. Heath as Leader of the party (although
he still held office as Foreign Secretary in the
Commons). Mr. Quintin Hogg, on the other hand, was
appointed to be Lord Chancellor, and now sits in the
House of Lords again as the holder of a new life peerage
with his old title of Lord Hailsham. One day perhaps
Sir Alec may follow suit.
My third and last Bill in that field was much more
ambitious. It was a new Parliament Bill introduced by
the Labour Government in 1969, and intended to deal
comprehensively with the composition and powers of the
House of Lords. It was a package deal-and in some ways
not a bad package at that. On composition, it would
have excluded from the House of Lords all future peers
acquiring title by succession and have removed the
power to vote (but not the right to attend and speak)
from existing hereditary peers. In the long run this
would have produced an upper Chamber composed ex-
clusively of members nominated as new Peers by
successive Prime Ministers acting within established
Parliamentary conditions. On powers the package was
less ideal. A reformed upper Chamber should have re-
ceived enlarged powers. Instead, the Bill proposed to
repeal the Parliamentary Acts of 1911 and 1949 and
substitute an even simpler and quicker procedure for en-
abling the Commons to overrule the Lords in the event of
a head-on clash on legislation, including subordinate
legislation.
The Bill was introduced after discussions which had all
but resulted in agreement between representatives of all
three parties; but the Government of the day, provoked
by a show of resistance by the House of Lords to the con-
tinuance by Order in Council of sanctions against
Rhodesia, withdrew from the discussions and subsequently
introduced the Bill as their own solution. Accordingly
the opposition parties were free to let their back-
benchers make hay with the Bill, which was also bitterly
opposed by a substantial and very vocal section of the
Government party, who wanted something-Tnuch more radical.
Between them they occupied so much time that the govern-
ment, in order to salvage the rest of their programme,
had to let the Bill drop. We don't have any automatic
time-tables on legislation. The Government can nearly
always impose one if necessary by moving what we call a
Guillotine motion. But this was the rare exception where
they could not count on their own party to support the
motion.
So in the long run this Bill came to nothing, and the House
of Lords continues to function as it did before, with the
sword of Damocles suspended over its august and venerable
head, and the existing Parliament Acts in the background.
In practice the Commons, and through the Commons the
Government of the day, have the last word on all amendments
made by the Lords on government legislation. When it comes
to the crunch the Lords don't "insist" on amendments which
the Commons disagree to, so there is no great point in
making such amendments in the first place. On the other
hand the Lords readily pass strings of Government amend-
ments designed to clear up any damage sustained by a Bill
during its passage through the Commons. There is there-
fore little left of one of the causes which were advanced
in 1857 and 1875 for the condition of "our awful statute-
book," namely "the uncertainty arising from inconsistent
and ill-considered amendments. "21
It is arguable that the British legislative system compares
unfavourably with those of the United States in that it is
far less democratic. Though groups of members of
Parliament acting in concert (especially if they belong
to the Government party) can influence the policy of a
Bill, individual legislators who may be eminent lawyers
and may be (or may fancy themselves as being) adept at
drafting have little chance of influencing even the
language and structure. As an example of the fury which
may be caused by this situation, here is part of a letter
to THE TIMES of 6th of April 1970 written by a well-known
lawyer who was then a prominent member of the Opposition
and is now a Minister in the new Conservative administration:
On the standing committees there are almost
invariably M.P.s who are practising lawyers
and professional men who have to interpret and
apply the Bills when those Bills become law.
They are capable of drafting amendments which
will work in practice. They do so, time and
time again as the order paper of any standing
committee testifies. Yet, time and time again
their efforts are treated with polite or
contemptuous rejection by Ministers. The language
of the parliamentary draftsman, who has not been
in the general practice of the law for years,
is forced on to the statute book by the whipped
(but sometimes protesting) backbench Government
supporters--not because the Minister (or
anyone else for that matter) knows what it
means but because it is quicker that way.
One cannot help sympathising with much of this, but the
fact is that it is very difficult for any draftsman,
however skilled and experienced he is, to prepare amend-
ments to another draftsman's Bill without doing some
accidental damage. In other words the best person to
settle the wording and position of an amendment to a Bill
is the draftsman of the Bill, not because he is a better
draftsman but because he is the draftsman of that Bill.
It has indeed been suggested from time to time that the
Houses of Parliament should be provided with their own bodies
of expert statutory lawyers, who would advise them as re-
quired on the Bills presented to them. This proposal was
first made in a report from the Statute Law Commissioners
which led to the appointment in 1857 of a Select Committee
of the House of Commons to consider means of improving the
manner and language of current legislation. That
Committee made no report, but another similar committee
was appointed in 1875, which among other things looked into
this proposal and turned it down flat. The grounds were
that the proposed system would impair responsibility,
place the Government draftsman in an invidious position,
lead to disputes with no means of resolving them, and
generally increase (with devastating effects towards the
end of a session) the delays inherent in the legislative
prodess. The proposal slept until 1931 when it was revived
in a different form before a Select Committee of the House
of Commons on Procedure in the conduct of Public Business.
This time the proposal was that each Committee on a Bill
should have its own expert draftsman who would go through
the Bill after the Committee Stage and clean it up so as
to make the result "clear and intelligible." The pro-
posal was not adopted (or even discussed) in the
Committee's report, but it was firmly panned by Sir
William Graham Harrison in the Article already referred
to.22
I can't help thinking that some of the objections to this
proposal may sound rather exaggerated to those who are
accustomed to State and Federal legislation over here. At
all events it appeared from the National Conference on
Federal Legislative Drafting in the Executive Branch,
which I had the privilege to attend in Washington several
years ago, that the legislative draftsmen of the two Houses
have the confidence of those of the Administrative
departments, and vice versa, and the two work efficiently
and harmoniously together, to give effect to the require-
ments of the Committee on the Bill. Perhaps, to revert to
Alan Ellis' observation, a "genius for adjustments" is
not a British monopoly.
Some Criticisms and Remedies
Having given a sketchy and selective account of the methods
by which we construct and maintain our Statute Book--from
which it appears that the governments of the day and their
permanent servants in the Parliamentary Counsel Office
are fixed with the responsibility for its shortcomings--
I turn to the main criticisms which are directed against
it and the attempts which have been made to correct some
of them. As indicated at the outset of these remarks, it
is not our most popular form of literature. Other Statute
Books have fared better in the past. I think it was
Herodotus who recorded how the Athenians employed Solon to
codify all their laws. When the job was done they were so
pleased with the result that they did two things. In the
first place, they took a solemn oath not to amend any of
the laws without his agreement; secondly, no doubt in order
to ensure at least a period of stability, they sent him
away on compulsory sabbatical leave for 10 years.
So far as Britain is concerned, the preface to the latest
work on legislative drafting2 3 begins with an apt quotation
from Gulliver's Travels:
This society has a peculiar cant and jargon of
its own that no other mortal can understand and
wherein all their laws are written, which they
take care to multiply.
This passage neatly summarises the two main criticisms
of our Statute Book, namely (a) that is is unintelligible
and Cb) that there is far too much of it. I shall deal
with these points in inverse, order and begin with the
quantity rather than the quality.
This brings us back to Lord Gardiner's address published
in the Law Quarterly Review, in which he rehearsed his
own initiative in establishing a permanent independent Law
Commission charged with the duty of promoting the reform
of the law, including statute law. After referring to our
total of over 3,000 Acts, he continued: "At long last
the consolidation into one Act of many statutes covering
the same field is proceeding at an increasing pace. Since
October, 1964, 28 Consolidation Acts have been introduced,
each repealing many existing Acts. So at long last we are
repealing more Acts than we are passing. In addition to
this, with the assistance of the Law Commission, we have
already repealed in Statute Law Repeal Acts 197 Acts and
parts of a further 246 Acts. Moreover, with the help of the
Law Commission and of the Statute Law Committee, of which
the Lord Chancellor is chairman and of whose Publications
Committee the chairman of the Law Commission is chairman,
we are in process of changing from a chronological statute
book to an alphabetical, or titles, statute book."
Lord Gardiner's figure of over 3,000 statutes wholly or
partly in force is indeed correct. Is this a disgrace to
a country whose legislative history extends over 750 years?
It averages out at about four Acts per annum over the whole
period, which is not perhaps excessive. I am informed
that two or three thousand Acts a year is the norm for some
of the State legislatures. But whether a disgrace or not,
it is fair to add that after nine years of the Law
Commission the number of Acts wholly or partly in force
in Great Britain appears to be very much the same as it
was in 1964.24
Nor would it be right to infer from Lord Gardiner's remarks
that the process of Statute Law Repeal owes more than a
marginal debt to the Law Commission. This pruning process
began well over 100 years ago, when our Statute Book was
really in a deplorable state. It was uncertain both what
Acts had actually been enacted as such in the earliest
period of Parliament; and which enactments of that and later
periods had been repealed by subsequent Acts. The first
of these problems was entrusted to the Record Commissioners
who produced an authentic edition of all Acts passed down
to the end of 1714. No more need be said hereabout that.
The second problem was mainly one of interpretation, since
it was not then the general practice to include a list of
specific repeals consequential on the passing of a new Act.
Repeals were either left to the operation of the general
principle that any enactment is repealed by implication by
any inconsistent subsequent enactment, or dealth with (if
that is the right expression) by a clause repealing, without
naming them ("all enactments repugnant to this Act").25
This practice pretty well ended with the establishment
of the Parliamentary Counsel in 1869, but the washing-up
left by previous operations had to be cleared off, and this
was done by a series of Statute Law Revision Acts (by now
some 42 in number) which repealed expressly all enactments
which had been repealed by implication (or by "splash"
repeal clauses) or which had expired by effluxion of time.
These Statute Law Revision Acts are not designed to alter
the law, and originally contained elaborate savings to insure
against doing so; they are merely designed to clear off the
books material which is physically present but legally
inoperative. And the approach is essentially conservative,
as illustrated by one instance which came to light in
the drafting of the House of Lords Reform Bill already
mentioned. 2  While the Bill was in draft it was suggested
by the officials of the House of Lords that we should in-
clude among the repeals an Act of Henry VIII regulating
the placing of Peers in Parliament. 27 This Act assigned
definite places in the House to all Peers, including the
Lords Spiritual, and had been largely ignored since the
advent of party politics, if not before;2 8 and it was
thought that the opportunity should be taken to get rid of
it. After some deliberation (since it was not wholly
consequential on what we were proposing) I included this
repeal as "obsolete or unnecessary."
Now one of the original sections of the Act of Henry VIII
was designed to secure an appropriate place in the House
for Thomas Cromwell, and it read as follows:
II And forasmuch as the Kings Majesty is justly
and lawfully supreme Head in Earth, under God,
of the Church of England, and for the good
exercise of the said most Royal Dignity and
Office, hath made Thomas, Lord Cromwell and
Lord Privy Seal, his vice-regent for good
and due ministration of justice to be had in all
causes and cases touching the Ecclesiastical
Jurisdiction, and for the Godly reformation
and redress of all errors, heresies and abuses
in the said Church.
It is therefore enacted by the authority afore-
said, that the said Lord Cromwell, having the
said office of vice-regent . . . shall sit and
be placed, as well in this present Parliament,
as in all Parliaments to be holden hereafter,
on the right side of the Parliament Chamber, and
upon the same form that the Archbishop of Canter-
bury sitteth on, and above the same Archbishop
and his successors, and shall have voice in
every Parliament to assent or dissent, as other
Lords of the Parliament.
This provision was "spent" on the death of Thomas Cromwell
and after a decent interval of over 400 years it was re-
pealed by the Statute Revision Act of 1948. But they
had left outstanding the first bit of the preamble to the
section, which was and still is cited in the text-books
as one of the authorities if not the authority for the
proposition that the sovereign (an-dnot the Pope) is the
Head of the Church of England. So we had to chose between
the alternatives of (a) repealing the whole Act, thus
laying impious hands on this part of the preamble to
section 2; and (b) expressly excepting from the repeal of
the Act a section of which the operative part had been spent
for 400 years and repealed for 20. Having obtained all
necessary approvals, we opted for (a). Pundits write in
to point out the mistake we had made, and in due course
Sir Michael English, one of the opponents of the Bill, got
on to the point and gave notice of an amendment at the
committee stage.
The committee stage of this Bill was taken on the floor
of the House, and when that happens there is no Report
stage unless the Bill is amended in Committee. Once it
became plain that the opponents were determined to obstruct
this Bill by all means fair and foul the government de-
cided to play them at their own game and neither propose
nor accept any amendments in Committee. If even one
amendment, however innocuous, had been accepted at that
stage, we should have had to endure the whole process
again on Report. So a battle of wits developed, the
opponents seeking by all means to find some real flaw in
the Bill, or at least some improvement on which we could
not decently refuse to accept an amendment; while we had
to find mistakes or defects in all the amendments they
proposed--which was usually fairly easy though the
opponents included two celebrated egg-heads in the persons
of Mr. Boyd Carpenter and Mr. Enoch Powell. There were in
fact two minor mistakes in one clause of the Bill, but
these they didn't find. On the other hand an amendment
to preserve the constitutional position of the Queen as
head of the Church looked like a winner. The battle was
not in fact joined, since the Government abandoned the
Bill long before we had reached the repeal clause. But
in the interval I had been doing some deeper research on
the Act of Henry VIII, and had found that it was at least
open to question whether the relevant part of the preamble
had not been repealed as long ago as 1555 by section 24
of 1 and 2 Phil. and M. c.8, the Act which restored (for
a few brief years) the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the
Pope, and repealed the series of enactments from 1529
onwards by which Henry had denounced and eliminated that
jurisdiction. After reciting and expressly repealing
some 19 of these Acts, the Act of 1 Phil. and M. proceeded
as follows:
XXIV And be it further enacted by the Authority afore-
said, that all clauses, sentences and Articles
of every other Statute or Act of Parliament,
made sithence the said XXth year of the reign
of King Henry the Eighth, against the supream
Authority of the Popes Holiness, or See
Apostolick of Rome, or containing any other
matter of the same effect only, that is re-
pealed in any of the statutes aforesaid shall
be also by the authoirty hereof from henceforth
utterly void, frustrate and of none effect.
It is perhaps worth lingering for a few moments over
these two Tudor enactments. Henry VIII is reputed to have
done a good deal of his own statutory drafting (as to
which it has been observed elsewhere29 that it must have
been more perilous than it is today to engage in the
national sport of jeering at the results). Who ever did
it, it is fine rolling stuff, packed with double entries
which we should not allow ourselves today. "Dignity and
Office," "good and due" ministration of justice, "causes
and cases," "reformation and redress," "errors, heresies
and abuses," "sit and be placed." There are similar
features in 1 & 2 Ph. & M. C. 8 S. 24--"clauses, sentences
and articles," "Statute or Act of Parliament," "void,
frustrate and of no effect." But the more interesting
feature of this enactment is that it contains what is
known in drafting circles as a "squinting modifier." Does
the phrase "that is repealed in any of the Statutes afore-
said" (i.e. the 19 Acts of Henry VIII which were indi-
vidually recited and repealed) refer back to "matter of the
same effect only" or to "every other Statute or Act of
Parliament" further up in the sentence? Disregarding the
punctuation, as one must, either construction is possible.
On one view s.24 repealed any sentence of any Act passed
since 1529 which contained only matter to the same effect
as the 19 repealed enactments, in which case the first
sentence of the preamble to s.2 of the Act of 1539 was
clearly repealed. On the other view s.24 merely re-repealed
any Act against the authority of the Pope etc., which had
been repealed by any of the 19 repealed enactments. The
latter construction is plausible because in those days--
and indeed right down to 1850 3 0 --the repeal of an Act re-
instated the previous law as if the Act repealed had never
been passed; so if you wanted to prevent the revival of
an act repealed by the Act which you were repealing, you
had to say so--and one method of saying so was to repeal
it again. The main difficulty in the way of this second
construction is that none of the 19 Acts of Henry VIII
had repealed anything, at all events specifically. What-
ever the answer to this question may be, those responsible
for the Statute Law Revision Act of 1948 were not obliged
to decide it, and very properly left it alone.
Despite the conservative approach just illustrated of our
Statute Law Revision Acts, they had reduced the physical
volume of the statutes actually in force in 1878 to the
point where they could be reprinted in a revised edition
comprising only 18 volumes. A second Edition was begun in
1888, the preface to which makes rather sad reading in
retrospect:
It is expected that the Edition will be completed
within 3 or 4 years; and the price of the whole
(inclusive of the Index and Chronological Table
of the whole Statute Law) will not exceed 7 or 8
guineas.
In Practice this Edition was not completed until 1929. It
covered in 24 volumes the whole of the Statutes down to
1920. The Third Edition was published simultaneously in
1951, and reproduced in 32 volumes the whole of the living
Statute Law down to the end of 1948. The intention was to
repeat this process about once every ten years, and never
let things get out of hand again. In practice nothing was
done in 1961 or in the next few years. This was not
strictly my business as First Parliamentary Counsel,
but had I forseen the future I should surely have made
it mine.
By 1965, 20 Annual Volumes had been added to the shelves,
making 52 in all with the 32 volumes of Statutes Revised.
In the same period about 37% of the material in the statutes
revised, and about 14 1/2% of the annual volumes, had been
repealed. A fourth edition produced at that time would
have occupied something less than 40 volumes. It was sorely
needed, and the text was ready to produce it. But Lord
Gardiner and the Law Commission were dissatisfied with an
edition of bound Volumes arranged in chronological order,
and this led to the setting up of the Publications Committee
referred to in the passage quoted above. The result to
date, six years later, is that we have no Fourth Edition
of the Statutes Revised, whether arranged chronologically,
alphabetically or in any other manner and little early
prospect of seeing one. 1 Meanwhile another 8 or 9 annual
volumes have been added to the shelves, with no correspond-
ing reduction of the earlier material; and the original 32
volumes groan under a series of manuscript insertions and
deletions, often piled on each other like Ossa on Pelion.
To this extent one can only agree that our Statute Book
is indeed "awful," but the responsibility for its con-
dition is certainly shared by the new Reformers.
Much of the intervening time has been spent on devising a
system of clarification with a view to arranging the Acts
according to subject-matter instead of according to their
chronological dates. The passage quoted above from Lord
Gardiner draws no distinction between an alphabetical
arrangement and an arrangement by subject matter, but the
difference is crucial. For purposes of ready reference,
which is the primary purpose of any revised edition, an
alphabetical arrangement would be as good as (and in some
ways preferable to) the standard Chronological. An
arrangement by subject-matter is clearly the wost of
the three. You have to begin by ascertaining which
volume contains the particular Act vou want before you
can even start to locate it there.3 2
For the purposes of any official republication of the
U.K. Statutes there is much to be said for adhering to the
natural chronological sequence. The date of an Act is a
vital dimension which should not be concealed. From the
practical point of view all our Acts have short titles
which include the calendar year of enactment; and when you
want to refer to an Act, whether to operate on it or just
to see what it says, by far the quickest thing Ps to go
to the Volume of Acts of that year in the revised statutes
and pick it out. The argument to the contrary is that if
the Act is one of a series you may need five or six vol-
umes open on your desk to trace out the combined effects.
It may be doubted whether this is all that more trouble-
some than keeping five fingers in the same volume of a set
arranged by subject matter. But if it is, we already have
in Halsbury's Statutes (a commercial publication not unlike
the United States Codes) a series arranged by subject
matter, which has advantages that no official edition could
enjoy. The boot is of course on the other leg where, in-
steq of merely republishing the exisitng law, you re-enact
it. In that situation it would be absurd to follow out
the original sequence of enactment: but it is unlikely
that the Parliament could find the time, if it had the in-
clination, to embark on so ambitious a venture. For the
time being at least we must look to the well-tried expedi-
ents of expurgation, consolidation (statutory codification),
and republication.
In the field of expurgation, the Law Commission has already
made a modest advance. The regular Statute Law Revision
Acts, as already demonstrated, were always conservative and
swept away nothing that could be said to have any potential
life left in it. The Law Commissioners, having taken over
from the Parliamentary Counsel the responsibility for this
class of legislation, can be a good deal bolder, and the
Statute Law Repeal Acts referred to by Lord Gardiner are
samples of a new approach. For example, if a dozen antique
statutes are all but obsolete, it is possible to make them
wholly obsolete by enacting (or re-enacting) one simple
clause. Parliament is always suspicious of officials, but
the independent position of the Law Commission commands
greater confidence. All proposals made by the Commission
(including proposals for Statute Law Repeal) are carefully
discussed beforehand with the professions and other inter-
ested parties, and are first published in the form of a re-
port to the Lord Chancellor with full annotations showing
exactly what they propose and why. Even so, their pro-
posals in the field of Statute Law Repeal have not all
survived the parliamentary battle. It seems nearly as true
today as it was when Cir Cecil Carr delivered his Car-
pentier lectures at Columbia in 194034 that the British
Parliament reacts emotionally rather than rationally to
proposals for the repeal of any part of Magna Carta, how-
ever obsolete. By the same token the Statute Law Repeal
Act 1969, which eliminated a number of antique and obso-
lete constitutional enactments, still left untouched the
House of Lords Precedence Act 1539.
The other main instrument which we use for keeping the
statutes in a more or less orderly condition is Consoli-
dation. What we know as a Consolidation Bill is a Bill
to re-enact (if possible in improved form but without
any change of substance) a series of previous enactments
dealing with a single subject. Parliament is jealous of
its legislative function, but an exception is made for
this type of Bill because it is essentially non-legis-
lative. Consolidation Bills are introduced in the House of
Lords, and referred after Second Reading to a Select Com-
mittee of members of both Houses, usually presided over
by one of the Law Lords, and composed wholly or mainly of
lawyers. The proceedings are non-party, and the main pur-
pose, if not the only one, is to make quite sure that the
Bill does not alter the substance of the law at all. In
this the Chairman and other members of the Committee rely
very heavily, as they must, on the draftsman of the Bill.
Once the Committee has reported that the Bill (with any
amendments they may have made) accurately reproduces the
existing law, all further stages in both Houses are taken
more or less formally, and no precious government time is
lost. (Mr. Graham Page 35 used to make some more or less
brief, and more or less derogatory, comments on Third
Reading in the Commons: but he is not muzzled by Office
and it does not appear that his mantle has fallen on any-
one else). The result of this relative immunity from
Parliamentary controversy and debate is that the Govern-
ment Whips don't care how many pure Consolidation Bills we
introduce in addition to the programme of substantive legis-
lation selected by the Cabinet for the Session. They occupy
no appreciable Parliamentary time.
Though one might conclude otherwise from the passage already
cited from Lord Gardiner's Article, the Law Commission has
not so far accelerated the production of Consolidation Bills.
Ever since 1947 the Parliamentary Counsel had maintained
a separate branch devoted exclusively to the preparation of
Consolidation Bills; and between then and 1965, when the
responsibility for this class of business (and the necessary
drafting force) was transferred to the Commission, we had
turned out 95 Acts at an average of over 5 per session.
Lord Gardiner's figure'of 28 includes 14 of these Acts,
some of them very substantial indeed. When the figures are
adjusted it appears that in terms of numbers of Acts passed
(which is not a very accurate test anyway) consolidation was
going along very well before the establishment of the Law
Commission, and perhaps not quite so well since.
This steady progress does not satisfy the more ambitious
reformers, who would like to see the whole of the Statute
Law of Great Britain consolidated into a manageable number
of principal Acts in the shortest possible time. This ob-
jective is in a sense implicit already in the terms of
reference of the Law Commission, who are required by their
Act to prepare and submit to the Lord Chancellor "compre-
hensive programmes of consolidation and statute law re-
vision."
What ever the true construction of that expression (in which
acute observers will detect another squinting modifier), the
Law Commission do not at present propose to attempt a total
consolidation. For one reason, they have more important
things to do. This proposal is (or is about to be) mooted
by a private body of lawyers and other professional consumers
known as the Statute Law Society, which formed itself in
1968 for the purposes of promoting improvements in the form
and publication of statutes, and of educating the public at
large about the legislative process. They issued in 1970 a
Report 3 6 telling us what is wrong with the existing system,
and will shortly issue another prescribing their remedies.
A total consolidation would (if otherwise possible) require
a greatly increased force of legislative draftsmen, and the
proposal is that the existing strength (of about 20) should
be reinforced (a) by instituting training courses for drafts-
men and offering attractive rates of pay and conditions in
the Parliamentary Counsel Office; and (b) by farming out
consolidation Bills to members of the Bar in general practice.
These proposals are not new, and there are certain diffi-
culties about them with which I shall not trouble you. But
some interest is now being shown in the idea that statute
law in general, and legislative drafting in particular, might
be included in the curriculum of some at least of our law
schools at post-graduate level.
We are of course well aware of the great benefits which
have been derived in the United States from the courses
maintained by the Legislative Drafting Fund at Columbia and
other learned institutions in the United States. Even over
here this is a relatively recent development. The Columbia
Law Review of 191337 included a review by Thomas I. Parkinson
of a book by Chester Lloyd Jones entitled "Statute Law
Making in the United States." The review was not too en-
thusiastic, but concluded as follows: "Our statutes are
still drawn by untrained legislators and persons of no
particular experience or training fitting them for the
business of drafting laws, and such persons will draft
better statutes if they carefully study this book."
The situation has greatly altered in the last 60 years.
The business of drafting Bills is still spread far more thin-
ly and more widely over the legal profession than it is in
the United Kingdom. But as the result of this enterprise
in the teaching of the legislative art, the profession it-
self, whether in the administrative departments, in the
State and Federal legislatures, in general practice or on
the judicial bench, is now permeated by lawyers nurtured in
the theory and practice of legislation. And this has
an indirect result not much less valuable than the direct,
in that the lawyer who knows the process by which statutes
are written and enacted is better equipped to understand
and apply them than the lawyer who does not. We should
certainly like to share these indirect benefits in England,
whether or not we really need more draftsmen and whether or
not the institution of training courses would increase the
supply if we did.
So much for the number of our statutes and the bulk of our
Statute Book. To sum up briefly, we were doing pretty
well in the way of purging, consolidating, and editing
before the arrival on the scene of Lord Gardiner, the Law
Commission and the Statute Law Society; and there are
hopes that the good work will continue. One is reminded
of the tale of Mr. Bethell (later Lord Westbury) opening
an appeal before the House of Lords. After he had been
going for a fairly short time one of their Lordships asked
testily: "Mrs. Bethell, how long do you expect this case
to continue?" He replied "My lords, before the Vice-
Chancellor this case occupied two days--but there were no
frivolous interruptions."
Turning to quality, there is by now a fairly well-known
anthology of judicial obloquy directed against the statutes.
You will find some of it in C.K. Allen's "Law in the
Making: ' 38 and more in R.E. Megarry's "Miscellany-at-
Law.'"B A prime favourite from the anthology is the follow-
ing thunderbolt hurled by McKinnon L.J. against s.4 of the
Trade Marks Act 1938;40
In the course of three days hearing of this case
I have, I suppose, heard s.4 . . . read, or have read
it for myself, dozens if not hundreds of times.
Despite this iteration I must confess that, reading
it through once again, I have very little notion
of what the section is intended to convey, and
particularly the sentence of two hundred and
fifty-three words, as I make them, which consti-
tutes sub-s. (1). I doubt if the entire statute
book could be successfuly searched for a sentence
of equal length which is of more fuliginous ob-
scurity.
As happens with other legal textbooks, one tends to find a
proposition repeated from edition to edition, and exported
from one book into another, without much critical examina-
tion. No other explanation can warrant the immortality
of the dictum of Brett M.R. in Hough v. Windus 41  in which
he castigated the legislature for being del- erately
"verbose and tautologous" because the substantive pro-
visions of s.146 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 were rein-
forced by the repeal in s.169 of part of the Statute of
Westminster the Second. As already indicated, Repeal
Schedules were a comparative novelty in 1884, and Brett
M.R. is readily forgiven for his vituperation. But
need we forgive the Statute Law Society for reproducing
this in 1970 in a document3 6 purporting to expose the vices
of modern Statute Law? No one suggests, least of all any
member of that office past or present, that the productions
of the Parliamentary Counsel are impeccable. But we do
verify our references.
it would be hard, even with unlimited time, to list and
examine all the complaints that are voiced against our
contemporary statutes, and a short selection must be
made, as follows:
(1) There is too much, or alternatively too little,
detail.
(2) There is too much, or alternatively too little,
textual amendment of previous enactments.
(3) We sometimes miss the ball altogether, and pro-
duce the opposite result to what was intended.
(4) We use a private style and language totally un-
intelligible both to the profession and to the
public.
(1) Detail. The argument that there is too much detail
comes from those who want to reduce the bulk of the stat-
utes or the load on Parliament. Bills should enact general
principles and leave the detail to be evolved either by
decisions of the courts or by subordinate legislation.
See for example Mr. Graham Page's memorandum of
January 15, 1971 to the Select Commission of 1970-71.42
On the other hand the practitioner and the judge are a
good deal happier if the case in hand is specifically
dealt with, and they don't have to work the answer out from
a general proposition.4 3 This is clearly a matter of
judgment in each case, bearing in mind the political as
well as the legal considerations. We can never forget
that a Bill is a Bill before it is an Act. As a general
principle, one has to screw it down tighter the more it
is likely to hurt. Finance is an obvious example, but
if there is anything an Englishman values more than his
money it is his driving licence.
Here is an instance in which it might perhaps have been
useful to apply one more turn of the screw. The Road
Safety Act 1967 introduced into Great Britain the rule
that you may not drive with more than so much alcohol in
the blood. Section 1 made it an offence to drive after
consuming alcohol in such quantity that the proportion of
alcohol in the blood, as ascertained by a prescribed test,
exceeded the prescribed limit. In Rowlands v. Hamilton
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the accused, who had been drinking, got involved in a
traffic accident. Before the police arrived, he repaired
to the nearest public house and drank three more glasses
of whisky. The prescribed test, which was subsequently
carried out, showed he had just double the prescribed
amount of alcohol in the blood, and expert evidence was
given that he would have been over the limit without the
additional three glasses. The House of Lords (with Lord
Pearson dissenting) held he could not be convicted. The
test did not show the alcohol present in the blood when the
accused was driving, and the expert evidence was not ad-
missible. This point cannot have been overlooked at the
drafting stage, for the practice of carrying a flask in
the car was well known in Scandinavia from which the
principle of this legislation was derived. Presumably
those responsible for the Bill relied on our courts to
fill in the detail for themselves. It would have been
simple to deal with the point by express provision, but one
mustn't forget the politics. The sacred right of the
Englishman to "hold his liquor" was being invaded for the
first time.
(2) Textual Amendment. When I first entered the Parliamen-
tary Counsel, there was some restiveness among Members of
Parliament about the way in which our Bills amended previous
enactments. It was said, with some justice, that clauses
which effected their objectives by a series of textual
amendments were quite incomprehensible to the members who
were asked to pass them.4 5 Various steps were taken to
meet these objections. In some cases we include a schedule
setting out the relevant enactments as amended by the Bill.
We also adopted the general practice of including in
parentheses words indicating the effect of other enact-
ments referred to in the Bill, whether for the purpose of
textual amendment or otherwise--for example:
. . . section 28 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1952
(which relates to committal to quarter sessions
with a view to a Borstal sentence)
These parenthetic indications illustrate the point that you
can't please everyone. Designed to help Members of Parlia-
ment and other general readers, they merely infuriate the
expert practitioners who already know what the enactment
referred to is about. I was once told by a leading firm
of stockbrokers in the City that as soon as the annual
Finance Bill is published they put one of their clerks
on with a blue pencil to strike out all these "aids,"
and this process is carried on with each fresh print of
the Bill down to and including the Act as passed. Unless
this is done, they simply can't read it. This is obviously
a situation in which footnotes would be appropriate, but
we are not allowed footnotes.
By the same token, whereas textual amendment is usually
the least explicit method of changing previous law, and
accordingly the least welcome to Members of Parliament, the
pressure group already referred to, the Statute Law Society,
are currently agitating for a much wider use of this tech-
nique and indeed would have it universally adopted wherever
possible. So keen are they on this panacea that they pre-
sented to the Select Committee on the Process of Legisla-
tion the relevant passages of their current draft report
before it had even been approved by their own Council.4 6
This is an old argument in which neither side fully under-
stands the other's point of view because they start from
different premises. It really depends on whether your eye
is fixed on an end-product which consists of an official
edition of Statute law kept permanently up to date--for
which purpose textual amendment is generally preferable; or
on the need to produce an amending statute in which the
change itself is presented, first to the legislator and
then to the practitioners who know the subject, in the most
direct and digestible form. The British draftsmen naturally
have their eye on the second of these objectives, and use
which ever method of arrangement is the better for the case
in hand. The attack on this sytem, or lack of system, was
opened in a paper presented to the Commonwealth Law Confer-
ence at Sydney in 1965 on behalf of the British Institute
of International and Comparative Law by H. H. Marshall and
Norman Marsh, the former Assistant Director of the Insti-
tute (and an ex-"Colonial" Attorney General) and the latter
one of the newly appointed Law Commissioners and a distin-
guished academic lawyer. 47 The latest shot in the campaign
(apart from the activities of the Statute Law Committee)
was fired by G. C. Thornton (also a "Colonial" draftsman)
in the work already mentioned. 23 One may not agree with
his conclusion, which is naturally in favour of the textual
system, but it is impossible not to relish the passage 4 8 in
which he describes our own approach:
The United Kingdom style produces a pottage comprising
direct amendments and provisions incorporating both
techniques. The effect, at least to one not nurtured
in his early years on English Statutes, is con-
fusing, particularly so as it rests on a stream
of consistently invidious and inevitably inconsis-
tent decisions as to which amendments should properly
be effected by one method, which by the other, and
which by both.
This is not a live issue in the States. But anyone interest-
ed enough in the argument to pursue it further will find an
antidote to the Marshall-Marsh Paper of 1965 in the Annex to
the Paper submitted to the 1970-71 Select Committee on
Procedure by Sir John Fiennes (my successor as First
Parliamentary Counsel). 4 9
(3) Missing the Ball. Derisive hoots arise from the
touchlines when this occurs. Sir Carleton Allen refers
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to the "ingenious and diverting manner in which so many
of our statutes produce results opposite to those intended."
One cannot deny that mistakes occur--when 1500 to 2000
pages of Acts are turned out per annum, mostly drafted or
amended (or both) under extreme pressure of time it would
be surprising if there were none. I was involved in the
Law Commission's recent report about the Interpretation
of Statutes,5 1 for the purpose only of preparing the draft
clauses set out in Appendix A at p. 51. But it did seem
to me that the moral to be drawn from many of the cases
discussed in that report was not that the principles and
practice of interpretation are defective but that the
enactment which caused the trouble, when examined with
hindsight, might have been better drawn. The Commission
took account of this point in paragraph 5 of their report,
but thought it an over-simplification. Anyway, as they
observed:52
There are practical limits to the improvements
which can be effected in drafting. Account must
be taken of the inherent frailty of language,
the difficulty of foreseeing and providing for all
contingencies, the imperfections which must result
to some degree from the pressures under which
modern legislation has to be produced, and the
difficulties of expressing the finely balanced
compromises of competing interests which the
draftsman is sometimes called upon to formulate.
But with all gratitude one must admit that the ball is
sometimes missed without any such alibi. Section 58 of
the Finance Act 1960, which was intended to deal with
the payment of interest on past as well as future assess-
ments, used the words "where an assessment is made."
It was held in Ex Parte Fysh 5 3 that previous assessments
were not covered, and the point had to be put right in the
Finance Act of 1962, s.26. On the other hand it is not
only Parliament and the draftsman who nod. The Bar and the
Bench have their blind spots too. One instructive example
was Hultquist v. Universal Pattern and Precision Engin-
eering Co.5 4 dealing with section 2 of the Law Reform
(Personal Injuries) Act 1948--a short and simple section,
the final subsection of which was printed over the page.
The question at issue in the case (and in five previous
cases) was expressly dealt with in the final subsection;
but it was not until Hultquist went to the Court of Appeal
that this was discovered, thus shedding a new light on
C. K. Allen's "ingenious and diverting manner" in which
Acts are found to mean the opposite of what Parliament
intended.
(4) Gobbledegook. The first thing a new draftsman has to
unlearn is that legislation has a separate language into
which his task (and only task) is to translate the instruc-
tions which he receives. The wording should be as plain
as is consistent with reasonable solemnity, and this is
certainly our objective. Nevertheless this allegation
of using a private language incomprehensible to anyone
else is heard from others besides Mr. Graham Page. It
is indeed one of the normal weapons of the opposition in
Parliament to brand as unintelligible any legislation
prepared by the Government of the day of which they dis-
like the policy. What was new in the last Parliament was
the glee with which Ministers themselves joined in the
witch-hunt. Consider the following back-hander from the
then Lord Chancellor, replying to a technical point
raised in the House of Lords on the Scottish application
clause of the Misrepresentation Bill:
5 5
I am, as your Lordships know, on the one hand
always as anxious as anyone to see our Statutes
written in plain English; on the other hand,
somewhat delicate in anything I say about our
present methods of Parliamentary drafting.
Yesterday I received from the Law Commission
a report which I shall of course be laying
before Parliament. . ; and there is attached
to it a draft of three clauses . . . These
clauses, I observe, are all written in
English.
What the Lord Chancellor apparently did not observe, or
at all events remember, was that these clauses were drafted
for the Law Commission by members of the Parliamentary
Counsel office seconded to them for the purpose. Perhaps
the moral, if any, is that the quantity of English to be
found in a draft Bill depends on the client rather than*
the draftsman. However that may be, this attack on the
draftsmen was repeated in Lord Gardiner's Article already
referred to. 5 6
Here again, the official draftsmen don't imagine that there
is no room for improvement; but here too it is arguable
that their performance is sometimes equal to that of their
critics. Let me end with a brief account of the last Act
(as opposed to the last Bill) that I drafted in the
office--the Wills Act 1968. 5 7 A hard case had been decided
in the Courts 58 in which two deserving beneficiaries under
a Will had been deprived'of their inheritance because the
Testatrix (in order to "make it legal" as she thought) in-
sisted on them adding their names as witnesses in addition
to the two independent witnesses. Before even the Law
Commission could react to this opportunity for reform, a
private member of the Commons rushed in notice of a Bill
to amend the Wills Act. The Government favoured his
enterprise and took on the drafting. It was not entirely
straightforward. We had to validate bequests made in
similar circumstances, but without creating the situation
in which bequests of shares of residue to A, B and C in a
Will witnessed by them and no other witnesses would all
be valid because there were two disinterested wintesses
for each of the three bequests considered separately.
In the long run, after some distillation, I produced the
following clause covering the positive and the negative
points in a pretty small compass:
For the purposes of section 15 of the Wills Act
1837 (avoidance of gifts to attesting witnesses
and their spouses) the attestation of a will
by a person to whom or to whose spouse there is
given or made any such disposition as is
described in that section shall be disregarded if
the will is duly executed without his
attestation and without that of any other such
person.
Having bagged that one off, I reached for my bowler hat with
the comforting thought that in 30 years' drafting I had at
least got one Bill right and sweet. Not a bit of it. Two
years later the Statute Law Scoiety, published their Re-
port on Statute Law Deficiencies. I read it eagerly. I
had long wanted to start up a scientific study of how
well or ill our products stood up after we had parted with
them, but never had the time. Here we should find the
answer, with all the work done for us by a learned and
devoted band of expert consumers. In this I was wholly
disappointed, but there was some stern comment on my
Benjamin: "An instance of the kind of ambiguous, badly
framed legislation which must be avoided was the Wills Act
1968." This was supported by the following comment from
an anonymous respondent to their (loaded) questionnaire:
"The use of the word 'without' suggests that the attes-
tation is not there, whereas the whole point of it is that
it is there. Modern usage would call for 'apart from,'
and if these words had been substituted for 'without' it
would not be necessary to read the section several times
in order to find out what it is trying to say." As
Professor Dickerson has remarked, one of the crosses the
legislative draftsman has to bear is the complacency and
condescension of the profession at large. 5 9 It probably
never occurred to the anonymous correspondent that the
draftsman would have carefully appraised the choice between
"apart from" and "without" before adopting the latter.
It is perhaps not obvious that either of these ex-
pressions is more modern than the other. But any competent
draftsman knows that "apart from" is ambiguous and
sometimes used, even in Statutes6 0 as equivalent to
"but for"--in which sense it would have been exactly wrong
in the context.
Instead of reproducing, without stopping to think, this
splenetic attack on the main clause, the Statute Law
Society might have fastened upon subsection (2), which,
believe it or not, reads as follows: "This section applies
to the will of any person.dying after the passing of this
Act." It seems that 30 years is not long enough to learn
to avoid the squinting modifier. 6 1
Conclusions
As regards the production of new Statute Law, the British
system differs substantially from those of the United
States and the several states. The differences are marked
both at the pre-parliamentary and at the parliamentary
stage. They flow from the absence in the United Kingdom
of any constitutional limitation of the powers of Parliament
and the presence there of effective control by the Govern-
ment over the input of Bills and the output of Acts. If
legislation is regarded, as it is in the United Kingdom,
as a primary objective of Government and almost an end in
itself, the British system is apparently the more efficient.
The American systems appear, at least to a stranger, to be
far more democratic.
As regards housekeeping of the Statute law, the processes
of expurgation, consolidation, and republishing have been
going on more or less actively in the United Kingdom for
well over 100 years, and have received some stimulus from
the recently appointed Law Commissioners. It is perhaps
only a personal view that their intervention in the field
of republication has been unfortunate. On any view, the
United Kingdom is far behind the States in the field of
re-enactment and likely to remain so. Such as it is,
the pressure for a total consolidation of all our Statute
Law comes from an unofficial self-appointed body whose
productions to date have not earned much admiration.
As regards quality, there is always a chorus of criticism.
Many of the complaints cancel each other out, and others
stem from prejudice or ignorance: but some at least are
justified, and the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
When an Act proves difficult to apply in a particular case,
still more where it is interpreted in a sense contrary to
the actual intention, 62 the conclusion of the draftsman is
not that the principles of interpretation need modification
but that the drafting was not good enough. We also have
much to learn from the universities in the States about
the teaching of Statute law and legislative drafting. The
dividends are more likely to be realised in better
interpretation than in better drafting. Some people,
including the author of these remarks, will never learn.
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